There's also a very real chance that commercial aviation may find itself operating in a GPS-denied environment, at least in various edge cases. For example, combat zones often employ GPS spoofing and jamming, and because radio waves don't exactly respect borders, this can sometimes affect civilian equipment outside of the combat zone. This has happened at least near Israel, Iraq, and Ukraine in the last few years. In other cases, truckers or rideshare drivers that want to spoof their company trackers end up parking too close to an airport and impacting planes on an RNAV approach.
> There's also a very real chance that commercial aviation may find itself operating in a GPS-denied environment, at least in various edge cases.
Yea, it's kind of terrifying that we are slowly putting all of our eggs in the GPS basket. I love GPS but when lives are at stake, you need a redundant backup navigation system that is robustly deployed and reliably works.
The VOR Minimum Operation Network[1] in the US is basically supposed to be that. They're decommissioning a lot of the VORs but at least guaranteeing that you'll be 100NM away from a working VOR and an airport with an approach that can be accomplished with VORs for the initial fixes.
Still definitely feels like putting a lot of reliance on GPS but at least there's a backup for the worst case.
There's also a DME Minimum Operational Network, for airliners that can use DME-DME RNAV. (That's too expensive for smaller aircraft to install, though.)
It's too bad that DME/DME RNAV isn't more widely available. The only real reason it's so expensive is that there isn't much demand for it since GPS (usually) works fine. Electronics-wise, it's not much more complicated than a transponder. Unlike a GPS, it does have to transmit, so it will always be somewhat more expensive than GPS.
The other problem is that there's a limit to how many aircraft a DME station can serve at a time (about 100), but I believe that could be greatly expanded if aircraft weren't pinging the DME so often. A position fix every second is generally fine, and it could be even more infrequent if you have a cheap inertial system to fuse with it that can fill in the track for a few seconds between pings.
Probably the required accuracy. VOR is on the order of a degree for accuracy. DME is around 0.1nm. So if you’re 50nm from the VOR, then you may have a position fix error of 0.87nm across the radial, if I did my math right.
For altitudes above 12,900 ft AGL, the official service volume for a DME is 100-130nm.
Below that it's considered "line of sight"... and some quick math shows that you'd be able to get line of sight >50 nm for all altitudes above 1700 ft AGL (which is very low).
If you're 100nm away, chances are there are more than 100 aircraft nearer to the DME than you from at least one of the two required DMEs. Especially if GPS has failed and many aircraft are trying to use backup DME-DME. Unless you're in a very sparse area.
No. After about 5000 ft AGL (give or take) you can't pick up cell tower signals at all, since the antennas are directional and pointed towards the ground.
This is a deliberate design decision, because even a low-altitude aircraft would have hundreds of cell towers in sight and would overwhelm the network when handsets tried to register on all of them.
But also: Pilots like being able to have guarantees about system accuracy. We get notices anytime even a single GPS satellite is out of service (even though there are 31 of them), and have software tools in the aircraft to predict if there will be any signal degradation along our route (RAIM). I can't imagine having anything near that level of guarenteed safety with an ad-hoc system like described.
I agree. Starlink could potentially be used as an alternative to GPS (and other similar constellations). But it will probably be a long time, if ever, before it's certified for civil aviation navigation. And it's also vulnerable to jamming.
I'm wondering if there's some doppler-shift assessment possible to detect (and possibly reject) spoofing/jamming? A fixed ground-based spoofer/jammer will be too consistent in its doppler-shift, unless it varies its frequency slightly, but that would only work well against specific targets, not broad areas.
> Radio waves experience Doppler shifts the same as sound waves do as objects move. The Doppler shifts for the real satellites will all be different as the object moves either towards or away from them depending on their position in the sky. However, the Doppler shift caused by the object’s motion due to a spoofer is the same for all the satellites signals because they are all arriving from the same direction. This uniformity of Doppler is another indication of spoofing. Again, only the most sophisticated spoofer can account for an object’s motion to adjust its Doppler shift for each individual satellite, and to do so requires tracking the object’s course.
I’m not sure if they still use it, but there was an Inertial Reference System on board - you set your location at the start of the flight, and then it can (roughly) give you a position using dead reckoning. A large disagreement between this position and the GPS position would result in an alert.
Definitely still a thing and I think that’s the goto when GPS fails. Of course there’s drift that accumulates. I think the primary threat to commercial aviation without GPS is guided landing systems where you need the location precision.
