I'm the guy you're talking about. Always easy to crap on people when you selectively quote what they said. The core pieces you left out are:
> I don't quite understand why requiring file protection/encryption can't be a temporary minimum bar here.
> or at a minimum require file protection/encryption.
If you think helping users to be safe online (which includes putting basic safeguards in place, like not leaving hundreds of unencrypted private keys on someone's desktop or downloads folder in plain text) isn't an important part of designing solutions for global scale, then we think about things very differently.
What we see different is that I don't collude *text stored inside a password manager* with *plaintext files left on someone's desktop or downloads folder*.
You clearly do, and even apply this philosophy to highly technical users. What I find ridiculous is that being able to copy sensitive information out of it is like 99% of what I do with password managers. It's the primary use case.
I'm the guy you're talking about. Always easy to crap on people when you selectively quote what they said. The core pieces you left out are:
> I don't quite understand why requiring file protection/encryption can't be a temporary minimum bar here.
> or at a minimum require file protection/encryption.
If you think helping users to be safe online (which includes putting basic safeguards in place, like not leaving hundreds of unencrypted private keys on someone's desktop or downloads folder in plain text) isn't an important part of designing solutions for global scale, then we think about things very differently.